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Summary 
Previous research suggests a number of candidate-level influences on candidate 
popularity like position on the party lists, political experience and social background. 
Questions about how party- and district-level variables affect candidate performance 
has, however, received scant scholarly attention. This study examines candidate 
attachment by linking almost all the candidates in the 2007 Norwegian municipal 
elections to party lists and municipalities. The Norwegian local election system allows 
parties to decide how much influence voters should have in the candidate selection 
process, something that gives us a unique opportunity to test hypotheses about how list 
type affects candidate popularity. This study test for two such effects: First, we expect 
more personal votes on candidates running on open party lists. Second, we suggest 
voters to act more independently of the rank-ordering on the lists if parties refrain from 
restricting voter choice. We test the two arguments using a multi-level approach in 
which individual candidate support is modeled with explanatory variables at both the 
candidate- party- and municipal-levels. The results depicts that candidates running on an 
open party list receive more personal votes compared to other candidates. Candidates 
with a favorable position on the party lists also do worse on candidate centered party 
lists. When parties choose to control the ballots, the rank ordering on the lists is more 
important. The analysis further reveals that candidates running in municipalities with a 
high number of farmers receive more personal vote than candidates in other 
municipalities. High district magnitude, however, reduces the number of personal votes. 
On candidate-level the analysis show that voters and parties are very much in agreement 
as to the preferred ranking of the candidates. Candidates at the upper end of the list, 
especially candidates at the top spot, receive a disproportional amount of personal votes. 
KEY WORDS *Candidate-popularity *Preference voting * Candidate-Centered Ballots * 
Party Ballots *Candidate-competition *Multi-level modeling * Contextual effects 
*Norway *Local elections 
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Sammendrag 
Tidligere forskning har vist at oppslutningen om kandidater i form av personstemmer er 
betinget både av kandidatenes plassering på partilistene, deres politiske erfaring og 
sosiale bakgrunn. Spørsmål knyttet til hvordan egenskaper ved partier og kommuner 
påvirker kandidatoppslutningen har blitt viet adskillig mindre oppmerksomhet i 
forskningen. Denne undersøkelsen studerer kandidatpopularitet ved å koble nesten alle 
kandidatene i kommunestyrevalget 2007 til deres respektive partilister og kommuner. 
Det norske personvalgsystemet ved kommunestyrevalg gir partiene stor frihet til å 
bestemme hvor mye velgernes personstemmer skal ha å si for kandidatutvelgelsen, noe 
som gir oss en unik anledning til å teste hypoteser om hvordan partienes bruk av denne 
friheten påvirket kandidatoppslutningen. I undersøkelsen testes det for to slike effekter: 
Først, forventer vi større oppslutning om enkeltkandidater på lister der partiene i større 
grad overlater kandidatutvelgelsen til velgerne. Deretter, forventer vi at velgerne 
personstemmer uavhengig av kandidatenes listeplasseringer på de mer åpne partilistene. 
Vi tester de to argumentene ved å benytte oss av flernivåmodeller der individuell 
kandidatoppslutning modelleres med forklaringsvariabler på både kandidat-, parti-, og 
kommunenivå. Analysen viser at kandidater på mer åpne partilister får flere 
personstemmer sammenlignet med kandidater på lister der partiene tar med kontroll 
over kandidatutvelgelsen. Når partiene velger å kontrollere personvalget (i form av 
stemmetillegg til mange kandidater) blir rangering av kandidatene viktigere for 
kandidatoppslutningen. Videre viser analysen at kandidater som stiller til valg i 
primærnæringskommuner får flere personstemmer enn kandidater i andre kommuner. 
Et høyt antall representanter i kommunestyrene bidrar på den annen side til å redusere 
oppslutningen om kandidatene. På kandidatnivå viser analysen av velgerne og partiene 
er nokså enige om hvilke kandidater de foretrekker. Kandidater høyt opp på listene 
(spesielt toppkandidatene) og kandidater med tidligere politisk erfaring får høy uttelling i 
form av mange personstemmer. 
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1 Introduction 
In multi-seat proportional systems (PR) both parties and candidates are potential agents 
of representation. The relative importance of these two actors of representation varies 
across electoral contexts (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen 2005:440). Even if the general 
trend in electoral reform is towards more open party lists, we «are only beginning to 
understand the consequences of such variations in electoral rules» (Ibid:446). The main 
question addressed in this study is how list type affects the performance of individual 
candidates. Previous research on individual candidate support has relied almost entirely 
on candidate characteristics in order to determine their popularity (Christensen and 
Midtbø 2007). Broader questions of how list type and campaign contexts shape 
candidate performance has been given scant attention in the political science literature. 
Furthermore, and as pointed out by Steenbergen and Jones (2002:234): «theory bridging 
the gap between micro and macro levels is still relatively scarce in political science». This 
study intends to explore this micro-macro gap by contextualizing the performance of 
individual candidates based on data from the 2007 Norwegian local elections. In 
addition to list type, we argue that social and cultural context are important sources of 
political information for voters about candidates. Hence, we estimate support for 
individual candidates by taking into account information at both the candidate-, party 
list- and municipal-levels. 
Our main argument is that candidate popularity in a list proportional system (PR) 
depends on the openness of the preference voting system. A candidate-centered voting 
system influences the viability of candidates in elections, and should therefore be on the 
top of the list of possible party list-level explanations of candidate performance. The 
Norwegian local electoral system gives local parties considerable freedom to decide how 
much influence voters should have in the candidate selection process. Therefore it 
provides an especially suitable case to test hypotheses about how actual use of this 
freedom affects the support of individual candidates. We argue that when parties can 
choose between restricting voters’ choice possibilities or to leave the candidate selection 
up to the voters, the choices made will affect not only the number of personal votes 
cast, but also the support for specific types of candidates. We test the argument through 
two hypotheses. First, we expect stronger support for individual candidates on party 
lists that provide voters with an open opportunity structure. Restricting voter choice, on 
the other hand, will lead to less overall support for candidates running on such lists. 
Second, on party lists where parties refrain from restricting preference voting we suggest 
that voters act more independently of the rank-ordering on the lists. In order to isolate 
the impact of the openness of the preference voting system we control for both 
municipal context and candidate-level predictors in the analysis. Thus, when we account 
for the variance in personal votes (percentages) on individual candidates we consider 
information at the candidate -, party - and municipal-levels. The analysis draws on a 
register-based dataset (actual performance records) for nearly all the candidates in the 
2007 Norwegian municipal elections. By matching them with parties and municipalities 
we locate candidates in their campaign environments. 
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The article proceeds as follows. After briefly sketching the local political setting in 
Norway as well the preference voting system, we further present our theoretical 
expectations. We then give an overview of the data sources. Finally, using multi-level 
modeling techniques, we test our propositions based on candidate-level data from the 
last local election in 2007, as well as on party-level and contextual data. The analysis 
addresses the topic by adding candidate characteristics to aggregate, cross-level models. 
Applying so-called random slope models, we also consider whether specific candidate 
effects themselves are influenced by how parties use the preference electoral system. 
Hence, our goal is to estimate candidate-level effects, party-level effects and their 
interaction. 
2 Norway: Local political setting and preference 
voting 
Norway has a long-standing tradition of local democracy and self-rule. Although 
Norway is a unitary state, municipal authorities are formally independent institutions 
governed by elected councils. Currently there is a two-tier system consisting of 430 
municipalities (kommuner) and 19 counties (fylker). The average size of the Norwegian 
municipality is about nine thousand inhabitants. 
In the European literature, elections are commonly perceived as contests between 
political parties (Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Farrell 1997). However, electoral systems 
still vary in terms of incentives to cast preference votes for individual candidates (Katz 
1986; Carey and Shugart 1995; Karvonen 2004; Grofman 2005; Van der Kolk 2007). In 
Norwegian local elections (opposed to national elections) voters choose not only 
between parties, but between candidates as well. It is a number of ways to combine 
preferential voting with a list system (Ibid). The preference vote may be separate from, 
and additional to, the party vote. Alternatively, the party vote may simply be the total of 
individual votes cast for affiliated candidates. 
In Norwegian municipal elections preferential voting is optional. Voters may cast a 
personal vote, but they are not obliged to do so. Second, although the voters can vote 
for as many candidates as there are candidates on the list, candidates cannot be ranked. 
Third, voters can cast a personal vote for a fixed number of candidates from other lists 
(up to ¼ of the seats to be filled in the council) (panachage). Each voter writes down the 
names on the preferred candidates from another list in a special section on the ballot. 
Fourth, voters can only vote for a single candidate once, not twice as pointed out by 
Van der Kolk (2007:171). Neither can voters delete candidates from the party lists, and 
option that was annulled prior to the 2003 local elections. Seats in the council are 
divided among the party lists in proportion to the parties’ share of the votes and among 
the candidates of each list in terms of their personal votes. Van der Kolk (2007:173) 
concludes that Norway belongs to the free list system category and that the electoral 
system is «relatively open». The degree of openness, however, depends on how local 
parties/lists choose to present their candidates. To counteract the effects of the 
preference votes the political parties can favor a limited number of their top candidates 
(giving certain candidates a so-called Stemmetillegg). Depending upon the number of seats 
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to be filled in the council, candidates may receive an additional 0, 25 personal vote for 
every party ballot cast. In councils with 11 to 23 representatives lists can give 
stemmetillegg to up to 4 candidates, between 25 and 53 council members allow them 6 
while the potential maximum number of candidates with stemmetillegg is 10 in the 
largest councils. The names of candidates with stemmetillegg are written in italics on the 
ballot paper. Obviously, these chosen few have a much higher probability of getting 
elected compared to other candidates. Candidates with stemmetillegg from the party 
have 25 percent more votes than other candidates before the personal votes are taken 
into consideration. Note however, that parties are free not to favor any candidates at all 
and by doing this they leave the candidate selection in the hands of the voters. Thus, 
voters supporting certain parties have more to say in the candidate selection process 
compared to those voting on other party lists. 
3 Explaining individual candidate support 
Previous research suggests a number of candidate-level influences on candidate choice 
like positions on the party lists, political experience and social background (Christensen 
and Midtbø 2007). For example, there is a strong and positive relationship between 
political experience and the number of personal votes. It can be argued that these 
candidate characteristics differ across locations and that this accounts for any apparent 
differences across parties and municipalities (Gainsbourgh 2005). However, we expect 
voters to relate their preferences for individual candidates also to the supply-side of 
politics, defined by what candidates and parties have to offer. We especially suggest that 
candidate popularity is conditional upon how local parties use the preference voting 
system to regulate voters’ access to the candidates. In order to test our two main 
hypotheses we divide possible explanations of candidate attachment into three levels: 
influences on candidate-level, party-level and municipal-level. We start out by further 
discussing how parties can regulate the supply of viable candidates, before we look at 
possible municipal-level explanations. We end up with discussing the different candidate 
characteristics that have attracted most attention in the literature so far. 
3 .1  Pa r t y - l e ve l   
At the party-level we propose that the support for individual candidates will depend on 
the number of viable candidates determined by the local party lists, the actual number of 
candidates on these lists and the type of list that the candidates run on. 
First, candidate competition should matter because Norwegian local parties/lists are in a 
position to choose either to control the ballot (issuing Stemmetillegg to many 
candidates) or to leave the candidate choice all up to the voters. We expect voters to be 
more stimulated to cast personal votes if their vote may have a significant impact on the 
outcome. We therefore suggest that candidate popularity is depended upon whether 
candidates run on a relatively closed party ballot or on a candidate-centered ballot. A relatively 
closed ballot indicates that the nomination and the rank-ordering of the candidates on the 
ballots are controlled by the parties/lists. On a candidate-centered ballot, on the other hand, 
voters choose candidates more freely. The more open the contest between the 
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candidates is, the more stimulated voters may become to cast personal votes and to 
choose candidates independent of how the parties have rank-ordered them. To measure 
the degree of voter influence, we include a variable that identifies how many candidates 
each party have given the initial advantage of 25 percent of party votes as personal 
votes. The variable should have a negative effect if relatively closed party ballots 
decrease individual candidate support. The total number of party lists in the analysis is 
2876 and the average number of candidates with stemmetillegg on these lists is 12.3 per 
cent. 10.7 per cent of the lists did not issue stemmetillegg to any candidates at all. 
Second, it can be argued that a large number of candidates on the ballots can make it 
more difficult for voters to pick their preferred candidate(s). The number of candidates 
varies from the minimum requirement of 7 to 84 candidates on the largest lists. We 
expect candidate choice to more difficult for voters on the larger lists. A variable 
measuring the number of candidates on the different lists is therefore included in the 
analysis. 
A third characteristic factor that can be expected to influence personal voting is the 
type of party lists that the candidates run on. We consider the possibility that the electorate 
shows a greater interest for candidates on non-partisan local list. These lists continue to 
mobilize voters on a geographical basis, and provide outlets for voters who are primarily 
engaged in single (and local) issues (Aars and Ringkjøb 2005). We therefore expect more 
preference voting on candidates running on local lists. In the analysis candidates’ 
running on local lists is therefore separated from the rest (4.3 per cent of the 
candidates). 
3 .2  Mun i c i p a l - l e ve l  
Gainsborough (2005:437) argues that voting research needs «increased attention to the 
political significance of place». Place (or context) is deemed important because it 
«influence what individuals learn and know about politics, and what can be recalled 
from memory for purposes of political judgment» (Cho et al 2006:158). Municipalities 
can affect the flow of information among voters, information that could be expected 
either to stimulate or to discourage individual candidate support. In the analysis we test 
for possible cultural, social and campaign contextual effects on candidate performance. 
Based on the literature we include two possible municipal cultural explanations. 
Norris (2004) argues that social modernization affects the strength of social identities 
and party loyalties. The idea is that the shift from industrial to post-industrial society is 
associated with rising level of human capital. This has consequences for the political 
culture as can be seen in marked contrast in political behavior in industrial and 
postindustrial societies. Especially, in traditional agrarian societies Norris argue that voters 
are more rooted to local communities, while voters in post-industrial societies are 
characterized by more contingent patterns of party support. In other words: the 
modernization process has transformed the basis of individual voting behavior from the 
politics of loyalty towards the politics of choice (Ibid:19). In electoral research it is well 
documented that post-industrial societies have witness an ongoing trend in partisan and 
social dealignment (Dalton 2002). We therefore expect party loyalty to be stronger in 
less modernized municipalities, something that should lead to less preference voting. 
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However, voters in less modernized municipalities may cast more preference votes as a 
symbolic act of supporting their respective parties. That is, they cast personal votes for 
candidates favored by the parties (top candidates). As an indicator of modernization we 
include the number of people employed in the primary sector in each municipality. In 
addition to primary sector employment we also test for population size. Dahl and Tufte 
(1973), in their seminal work on size and democracy, argue that political participation 
tends to be higher in smaller communities compared to larger ones. The idea is that 
small size goes together with a more homogenous society, in which voters are more 
oriented towards individuals than collectives (here candidates rather than parties) (see 
Rose 2002). Previous Norwegian research has also shown that preference voting tends 
to decrease when the size of the municipalities increases (Christensen and Midtbø 2007). 
We therefore expect preference voting to be associated with small municipalities. 
Furthermore, it is well known that social conditions may discourage participation (Cho 
et al 2006). Participation research shows that deprived neighborhoods are associated 
with lower participation rates. We expect this also to be the case in Norwegian 
municipalities, and that preference voting decreases when living conditions get worse. In 
order to measure local social and economic hardship (SES), we include an index of local 
SES in the analysis. Low scores on the index (closer to 0) indicates good living 
conditions, while higher scores (closer to 10) indicate poorer living conditions. 
Preference voting may finally depend on the local campaign context. In municipalities 
with a fragmented party system it can be difficult for voters to choose their preferred 
candidate(s). The idea is that a lack of clear responsibility for policy outcomes makes it 
harder for voters to choose not only between parties, but between candidates as well. 
However, if a fragmented party system makes it difficult for voters to assess 
responsibility to parties, they may go for the candidate option instead. In the analysis we 
use Laakso and Taagepera’s effective number of electoral parties as an indicator of party-
system fragmentation (se Gallagher and Mitchell 2005:598–99). In 2007 the number of 
effective parties ranged from 1.6 to 6.9 in the municipalities (mean 4.5). Finally, we 
suggest that district magnitude affects personal voting. In Norwegian local elections the 
municipality is the electoral district, and the number of municipal council 
representatives varies from 11 in the smallest municipalities to 85 in the largest. We 
expect that competition between the candidates is more intense in the smaller 
municipalities compared to larger ones, something that should stimulate to more 
preference voting. Thus, high district magnitude should have a negative effect on 
individual candidate support. In order to measure this we simply include the number of 
council members elected from each municipality in the analysis. 
3 .3  Cand i da t e– l e ve l  
The analysis includes several candidate-level control variables, all variables that the 
literature on preference voting suggests are important for candidate popularity. The two 
most obvious reasons voters may have to support individual candidates are the 
candidate’s position on the party lists and their political experience (Christensen and Midtbø 
2007). Top candidates are more likely to get elected. They attract voters who do not 
want to waste their votes and the electorate should be more familiar with them through 
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the media. In the analysis we therefore separate top candidates from the others. In 
addition both Norwegian and international literature documents a strong correlation 
between candidates’ position on the party ballot and their share of the personal votes, 
independently of the type of the personal election system (Norris et al. 1992; Rallings et 
al. 1998:123; Johansson 1999; Pedersen 1995; Elklit and Jensen 1997; Kjær 1997; Farell 
1997; Christensen and Midtbø 2007). The candidate’s position on the party list (1, 2, 
3… etc.) are therefore included in the analysis. Also political experience seems to increase 
voter’s willingness to support such candidates (Hazan 2002:115; Norris 2004:189). As a 
rough indicator of political experience, we include a variable that identifies candidates 
with previous experience as a mayor. 
Finally, age and gender are included as control variables. The idea of a gender 
discriminating electorate goes back to Duverger’s (1955:89) classical analysis of 
Norwegian municipalities. His conclusion was not clear-cut, but this «anti-feminist» 
element has lived on in Norwegian research where the preference vote system has been 
portrayed as one of the culprits behind the skewed gender representation in local 
politics (Hellevik and Skard 1985; Hellevik and Bjørklund 1995). Recent Norwegian and 
international research, however, questions not only the scope, but also the sheer 
existence of gender bias in preference voting (Christensen and Mitbø 2007; Norris et al. 
1992:497-498; Rule and Shugart 1995; Welch and Studlar 1988:280; Caul 1999; Black 
and Erickson 2003; Karvonen 2004; Wängerud 1999, 2000). When it comes to age an 
analysis of the Swedish personal election reform concludes that younger candidates 
receive more personal votes than older candidates (Håkansson 1999:207). Age is 
measured through a dummy variable which distinguish candidates under the age of 35 
from the rest. All variables included in the analysis together with their definitions are 
shown in table 1. 
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Table 1: Independent variables and definitions 
Variable name Variable description 
Candidate-Level 
List position The candidate's position on the list 
Top candidate Dummy=1 for candidate on top of the list, 0 otherwise 
Male Dummy=1 for male candidates, 0 for female 
Young Dummy=1 for candidates aged 35 or younger, 0 otherwise. 
Mayor Dummy=1 for mayors in the previous period. 
Stemmetillegg Dummy=1 for candidates with stemmetillegg, 0 otherwise. 
Party-level 
Favoured candidate Percent candidates favoured by local parties (stemmetillegg) 
Number of candidates The number of candidates on each party/local list 
Non-partisan lists Dummy=1 for candidates running on non-partisan lists, 0 otherwise 
Municipal-Level 
Population size The number of inhabitants  
Primary sector  Percent of population employed in the primary sector of the economy 
Number of parties The effective number of electoral parties in the municipality 
SES Social economic hardship (index) 
District magnitude  The number of council members in the municipalities 
4 Data and method 
The analysis draws on three types of data sets. The first set provides information on 
external characteristics for almost all of the candidates in the 2007 local elections, the 
second captures the party list-level variables while the third compromises the data at the 
municipal-level. The first dataset (collected by two Norwegian computer firms, 
ErgoEphorma and EDB Business partner), comprises 58600 candidates from 423 of the 
430 municipalities.1 It contains information about the candidates' personal votes, 
gender, age, party attachment, party support, the position on the list before the voters’ 
corrections, and the candidate’s political experience. Candidates who have been given an 
additional vote (Stemmetillegg) by their party are also identified. In order to examine 
how list type (candidate competition) and context affects candidate performance the 
data from the candidate lists are linked to the party- and municipal- levels by geographic 
identifiers and list numbers. The party-level dataset includes information on candidate 
competitiveness (per cent candidates favored with Stemmetillegg), the number of 
candidates on each list and a dummy-variable (coded 1) for non-partisan lists. The 
municipal-level dataset includes information about the local party system (the effective 
number of electoral parties), district magnitude, population size, the number of 
employees in the primary sectors and an index measuring local social economic hardship 
(local SES). Descriptive statistics for all variables in the analysis is shown in table 2. 
The dependent variable is the percentage personal votes for individual candidates. 
This includes both within-party preference votes and between-party preference votes 
(panachage). Before presenting the models tested, we take a closer look at the distribution 
                                                 
1 The seven municipalities omitted from the analysis are all small, and did not report their electoral results trough the 
databases provided by the two computer firms. 
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of the personal votes. Table 2 depicts the relative number of personal votes in the 2007 
municipal elections. The average municipal council candidate received 6.2 per cent of 
the party votes as personal votes (sd. 10.6 percent). The personal votes were unequally 
distributed between the candidates. Several candidates running on small party lists even 
turned out to be far more popular than their own party (receiving more than 100 per 
cent of the party vote as personal votes). Detailed analysis shows that among the larger 
established parties, candidates from the Christian Democratic Party attracted the most 
personal votes, while the candidates from the Progress Party received the lowest share 
of personal votes (not shown). The average female candidate received 5.6 per cent 
personal votes, and male candidates turned out to be more popular than female 
candidates in all the established parties. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Candidate-level descriptive statistics 
Variable name N Mean  SD Minimum Maximum 
Personal votes (per cent) 58600 6.22 10.62 0 225 
List position 58600 14.20 10.59 1 85 
Top candidate 58600 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Male 58600 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Mayor 58600 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Young (under the age of 35) 58600 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Party-level descriptive statistics 
Variable name N Mean  SD Minimum Maximum 
Number of candidates 2876 21.53 10.62 7 90 
Candidates with stemmetillegg (per cent) 2876 12.38 9.05 0 75 
Non-partisan list 2976 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Municipal-level descriptive statistics 
Variable name N Mean  SD Minimum Maximum 
District magnitude 423 30.95 12.85 11 85 
Population size 423 11023.83 32304.40 356 548617 
Local social and economic hardship (SES) 423 5.47 1.91 1 9.70 
Primary sector employment 423 8.43 6.28 0.20 29.10 
The number of parties 423 4.21 1.08 1.63 6.95 
The data we use are nested (clustered) and therefore not sampled independently of each 
other. The candidates represent distinct party lists and run in distinct municipalities. 
There are several ways to deal with this type of data-structure, but the literature 
recommend to specify multilevel models (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Hox 2002; 
Snijders and Bosker 2004). This is also the approach followed here. The empirical 
analysis is made through five steps (Hox 2002:51–54). We start out by estimating so-
called empty (also called «unconditional» or «null») models to determine the size and 
significance of the intraclass correlations. The latter is determined by Likelihood Ratio 
tests comparing varying intercept models with single intercept models. Next, we 
proceed to present a model with only candidate-level independent variables. The 
intention at this point is to see how much of the variance at the party- and municipal-
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levels that can be explained by candidate-level variables. We then proceed to add the 
party-level variables, before we turn to the municipal-level explanatory variables. These 
last three steps are usually denoted as variance component models (Ibid:52). This means that 
so far our interest is to study the intercept variance in light of the different variance 
components for the candidate - party- and municipal levels. In other words: we assume 
that the intercept vary across party lists and municipalities (the level of individual 
candidate support), while the actual slope coefficients are fixed. In the final stage we 
move on to investigate if the slope for the list-position variable at the candidate-level 
has a significant variance component between the lists (random coefficient model). Thus, do 
the effects of list-position vary between the party lists? The fifth (and final) step is to 
test for the hypothesized cross-level interactions between list-position (candidate-level) 
and the number of favored candidates at the party-level. 
5 Analysis 
Is there significant variation in support for individual candidates at both candidate-, 
party- and municipality-levels? Model I in table 3 estimates the empty model and reveals 
the answer. The first column provides us with information on the variance at the 
candidate-, party- and municipal-levels. The results depicts that there is significant 
variability around the intercept when it comes to individual candidate support at all 
three levels (Level-1 variance=90.83, Level-2 variance=5.12 and Level-3 
variance=22.21). To get an idea of how much of the overall variance in candidate 
support that is attributed to either the candidate-level, the party-list level or the 
municipal-level, the intraclass correlations (ICC) are calculated. The ICC measures the 
proportion of the variance of the dependent variable between candidates, party lists and 
municipalities. Since the dependent variable is measured at the candidate-level (Level-1) 
this level should also have the highest ICC score (Steenbergen and Jones 2002:231). The 
proportion of variance in candidate popularity between candidates is 77 per cent (that is 
100 times 90.84/(5.12 + 22.21 + 90.84). More interesting, however, is that the party list 
and municipal-levels together account for 23 per cent of the variance in candidate 
support. The ICC scores also show that the two higher levels of analysis do not seem to 
play an equally important role. The party-level accounts for 4.3 percent of the variation, 
and seems to be less important for the variation in personal votes compared to the 
municipal-level which account for 18.8 percent of the variation in candidate support. 
Note, however that even quite small ICC scores can indicate considerable variation in 
the dependent variable (Ibid.). In our case 95 per cent of the party lists have a plausible 
value range when it comes to the number of personal votes between 3.5 and 12.3 per 
cent (i.e. 7.909776   1.96 * sqrt(5.12195)). Thus, whilst candidates on some lists get a 
considerable amount of personal votes, candidates on other lists do not. Hence, the 
analysis so far confirms that it is worth to look closer at our hypothesis about possible 
party list effects on individual candidate support. The ICC scores also reveals that we 
cannot ignore the multilevel nature of candidate popularity, doing this would lead to 
incorrect statistical inferences (Ibid). 
WORKING PAPER  3-2010 CONTEXTUALIZ ING CANDIDATE  POPULARITY 
14 
Table 3: Multi-level regressions: Percent personal votes (Norwegian local elections in 2007). Random 
intercept models with robust standard errors.  
 MODEL I  
Empty 
model 
Model II 
Candidate-
level  
Model III 
Party-level  
Model IV 
Municipal-
level  
Model V 
Final model 
Fixed Effects      
Constant 7.90* 5.55* 5.45* 5.49* 5.50* 
Male  0.74* 0.73* 0.73* 0.73* 
Young  -0.24* -0.23* -0.24* -0.24* 
Stemmetillegg (favoured)  4.94* 5.27* 5.26* 5.26* 
List position  -0.18* -0.17* -0.17* -0.17* 
Top candidate  23.55* 23.37* 23.38* 23.38* 
Mayor  3.88* 4.00* 3.97* 3.96* 
Party-Level      
Local list   1.09* 1.04* 1.03* 
Number of candidates   -0.09* -0.08* -0.08* 
Candidates with stemmetillegg   -0.09* -0.08* -0.08* 
Municipal-Level      
Primary sector employment    0.27* 0.25* 
Population size    0.00* 0.00* 
District magnitude    -0.12* -0.12* 
Number of parties    0.21  
Local SES    -0.31* -0.31* 
Random effects (variance components)  
Candidate-Level variance (σ2) 90.84* 52.77* 52.77* 52.77* 52.77* 
Intraclass correlation (ρ) 0.770     
Party-Level variance (τ00) 5.12* 5.67* 5.10* 5.10* 5.10* 
Intraclass correlation (ρ) 0.043     
Municipal-Level variance (w00) 22.21* 18.08* 15.17* 9.48* 9.53* 
Intraclass correlation (ρ) 0.188     
Deviance 433784.929 403005.222 402770.552 402594.655 402596.268 
Deviance compared to previous 
model 
 30778.707* 234.670* 410.568* 408.955* 
N Candidate-Level 58 600 58 600 58 600 58 600 58 600 
N Party-Level 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876 
N Municipal-Level 423 423 423 423 423 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates * P<0.01 
The next question to address is whether the variance at the party- and municipal-levels 
holds when we the candidate-level explanatory variables are introduced in the model. 
Model II in the second column reveal the answer and show the ML estimates of the 
fixed effects and again we report the variance components at the three levels. First, 
model II clearly represents a significant improvement compared to the empty model 
(the difference in deviance is 30778.707, p<0.01). Furthermore, we see that all 
candidate-level variables are significant, but not equally decisive for the number of 
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personal vote. One step up on the party list gives around 0.18 percent more personal 
votes, and the top position itself is worth nearly 23.55 per cent personal votes. The extra 
vote from the party (stemmetillegg) is worth about 5 percent in personal votes. Previous 
experience as mayor also has a strong effect on the number of personal votes (3.88 per 
cent). According to model II female candidates receive 0.74 percent less personal votes 
than men, controlled for the other explanatory variables. Also young candidates (under 
35) receive less personal votes, compared to older candidates (0.24 per cent). 
Turning to the variance components model II show that all three remain significant 
after controlling for the candidate-level predictors. Comparing the candidate-level 
variance component with that of the empty model shows that the difference is 90.84 – 
52.77=38.07. Relative to the size of the ANOVA variance this is a reduction of 
38.07/90.84= 0.419. This means that the candidate-level variables explain about 42 
percent of the candidate-level variance in personal votes. Thus, there are more left to 
explain at the candidate level. When it comes to the party list-level the candidate-level 
predictors explain around 11 per cent of the cross party list level variation in personal 
votes (that is 5.12–5.67/5.12=-0.107). This indicates that the model is not very 
successful at the party list-level, in which much of the variance in personal votes is still 
unaccounted for. Turning to the municipal-level the corresponding figure is 18.6 per 
cent (22.21–18.08/22.21). Thus, the candidate-level predictors contribute more at the 
municipal-level compared to the party list-level, but also here more variation is left to be 
explained. 
The next step is to introduce the party list-level predictors in the analysis. Model III 
show the results after entering the three party list-level variables. Here we seek to 
explain why support for individual candidates varies between party lists controlling for 
determinants at the candidate-level. All three party list-level variables are considered 
simultaneously, and all have explanatory power. Comparing the deviance scores with the 
previous model again shows that model III represents a significant improvement 
compared to the previous model with candidate-level predictors only. Turning to our 
explanatory variables we see that candidates representing non-partisan local lists get (as 
expected) more personal votes compared to candidates on other lists.2 The model also 
depicts that the number of candidates leads to less support for individual candidates. 
One additional candidate on a party list reduces the number of personal votes with 0.09 
per cent. Importantly, however, model III confirms our first hypothesis, namely that 
candidates running on semi-closed list receive less personal votes compared to 
candidates running on more open party lists. A one per cent increase in the number of 
candidates with stemmetillegg reduces the number of personal votes with 0.09 per cent. 
Apparently, then, the way parties choose to present their candidates make a difference 
for how the candidates perform. Finally, model III reveal that the variance components 
at the two higher levels remains significant. Comparing the variance components with 
those of the empty model shows that the party lists-level variables (and the candidate-
level predictors) explain about 39 per cent of the cross party variation in personal votes 
(i.e. 5.12–5.10/5.12). Taken together, the candidate- and party-level predictors reduce 
                                                 
2 We have also tested the possibility that candidates on larger, well-established party lists received more attention from 
the media and the electorate and thus more personal votes. The variable failed to reach significance.  
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the cross municipal variation in candidate popularity by 29 per cent compared to the 
empty model. The variance component at the candidate–level is, as it should be, 
unchanged. 
The two final columns in Table 3 show the results after adding our municipal-level 
predictors. Model IV reveal that the number of parties has no significant effect on 
individual candidate support, and is therefore omitted from the final model presented in 
the last column. The three other municipal-level variables, however, seems to be 
important for candidate popularity. Culture, at least the way it has been defined here, 
seems to affect the number of personal votes. In municipalities with a high number of 
farmers candidates are more likely to receive personal vote compared to other 
municipalities. Model V also suggests (as expected) that personal voting in poor 
municipalities tend to be lower than in the richer municipalities. Hence, personal voting 
requires not only resources at the individual level, but also at the municipal level as such. 
Limited resources should reduce the amount of political information which in turn 
should reduce the amount of personal voting. Turning to the local campaign context, 
we see that district magnitude reduces the support for individual candidates. One 
additional candidate in the council reduced individual candidate support by 0.12 per 
cent. Finally, the variance-components show that introducing the municipal-level 
variables lead to a further reduction in the variance on the municipal-level (from 15.17 
in model III to 9.95). The variance component at the two other lower levels remains 
unchanged. 
Finally, we turn to discuss the second basic argument. Do voters voting on party lists 
which do not restrict their opportunity structure act more independently of the rank-
ordering on these lists? Table 4 addresses the argument through two stages. In the first 
column, we simply seek to explore whether the list-position variable at the candidate-
level varies at the party list-level. Thus, we add a random slope coefficient to our model. 
The result reported in the first column indicate that the effect of list position at 
candidate-level do vary significantly across the party lists. Having a high position on a 
party list has different effects across the lists. Note also that the previous significant 
effect of the number of candidates at the party list-level is no longer significant, and 
therefore deleted from the final model. Also population size at the municipal-level 
moves closer to being a borderline predictor (t-value 2.505), which is somewhat 
surprisingly considering results in other studies. On reflection, though, it can be argued 
that any effect of municipal size on personal voting is likely to be in large part spurious 
or at least indirect. Size does say something about the degree of transparency in local 
politics. That said, size is included also in the final model. Nonetheless, the social and 
demographic composition of municipalities - which do vary with municipal size – might 
be even more important for personal voting than size as such. Indeed, this is what our 
analysis seems to indicate. 
The final model (model VII) moves one step further by trying to explain the varying 
list position coefficient (again Table 4). In order to do this we include a cross-level 
interaction effect in the model to see whether the individual effect of list position is 
influenced by the number of candidates favoured at the party list-level. The results 
depict that the effect of list position is affected by the share of initial votes given to the 
candidates at the party list-level. This effect is not difficult to explain: If parties take 
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control of the lists through giving many candidates initial personal votes (stemmetillegg), 
then list position should be less important for voters as a tool to select candidates. Thus, 
the positive and significant interaction effect yields support to our initial argument. The 
effect of list position at the candidate-level is moderated when the party lists provides 
voters with an open opportunity structure. 
Table 4: Multi-level regressions (robust standard errors): Percent personal votes. Final model with 
random slope and cross-level interaction effect (Norwegian local elections in 2007). 
 MODEL VI: 
Random slope  
Model VII: 
Full model with cross-level interaction 
Fixed Effects   
Constant 3.73* 3.77* 
Male 0.82* 0.82* 
Young -0.34* -0.34* 
Stemmetillegg (favoured) 5.30* 5.40* 
List position -0.45* -0.45* 
Top candidate 20.72* 20.69* 
Mayor 5.58* 5.55* 
Party-Level   
Local list 0.60** 0.61** 
Number of candidates -0.00  
Candidates with stemmetillegg -0.09* -0.8* 
Municipal-Level   
Primary sector employment 0.16* 0.15* 
Population size -0.00** 0.000004** 
District magnitude -0.09* -0.09* 
Local SES -0.23* -.0.23* 
Cross-Level interaction effects   
List position * candidates with stemmetillegg  0.01* 
Random effects (variance components) 
Candidate-Level variance (σ2) 43.38* 43.38* 
Party-Level variance (τ00) 0.69** 0.71* 
List position 0.29* 0.29* 
Municipal-Level variance (w00) 4.84* 4.83* 
Deviance 395149.797 395143.531 
Deviance compared to previous model 7446.470* 25.509* 
N Candidate-Level 58 600 58 600 
N Party-Level 2876 2876 
N Municipal-Level 423 423 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates. *P<0.01 ** P< 0.05 
6 Conclusion 
Elections are not only a contest between political parties. Many PR electoral systems 
allow voters a say in the election of individual candidates. Since the Norwegian local 
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electoral system gives parties considerable freedom to decide how much influence 
voters should have in the candidate selection process, it provides an especially suitable 
context to test hypotheses about how list type affects candidate popularity. Two basic 
arguments about how list type affects candidate support has been developed and tested 
in this analysis. First, we expected stronger support for individual candidates on party 
lists that provided voters with an open opportunity structure. Second, we suggested 
voters to act more independent of the rank-ordering on the party lists if provided with 
an open list. In order to test these arguments we have controlled for a wide range of 
predictors at both the candidate-, party list- and municipal-levels. The results reveal that 
the analysis supports both arguments. That said, several other contextual characteristics 
are important for the success of individual candidates within the framework of a 
partisan political system. 
The most interesting finding is that the way which parties use the electoral system to 
determine voters influence matter for how individual candidates perform. The more 
candidate centered ballots, the stronger support for individual candidates. On party lists 
in which they take a stronger control over the candidate-selection process candidates 
receive fewer personal votes. The results also indicate that the strong effect of list 
position at the candidate-level is moderated by the number of candidates favoured at the 
party list-level. Introducing a cross-level interaction between list position (candidate-
level) and favoured candidates at the party list-level shows that individual candidate 
effects are influences by how parties use the electoral system at the party list-level. The 
effect of the list position variable decreases when parties loosen their control over the 
party ballots, and let voters choose candidates in the order they prefer on a more open 
list. 
Furthermore, the analysis finds support for the hypothesis that personal voting is 
lower in poorer municipalities. On the other hand, voters in municipalities with a high 
number of farmers are more likely to give a personal vote compared to voters in other 
municipalities. Population size, also affects personal voting with fewer personal votes on 
candidates running in larger municipalities. Finally, high district magnitude reduces the 
number of personal votes on the candidates. At candidate-level the result squares well 
with recent (but limited) international research. We find that list position has a decisive 
effect on the personal votes. Candidates on top of the list receive more personal votes 
than candidates at the bottom, and candidates at the very top receive more votes than 
anyone else. Candidates given priority by the parties in terms of stemmetillegg, also get 
numerous personal votes. That candidates with previous political experience tend to be 
more popular than inexperienced candidates is also as expected. The analysis also 
suggests that young candidates are less popular than older candidates, and that female 
candidates receive less personal votes than men. In sum the analysis reveals that list 
position and experience are the most important determinants of personal voting at the 
candidate-level. Our finding has implications for voter research seeking to explain 
candidate popularity both within and between countries. Candidate popularity is not 
merely a question of who the candidates are, but also on which party list they run and 
on constituency characteristics. 
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